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Not for publication appendix to the paper: 
The Persistence of Inferior Cultural-Institutional Conventions 
BY MARIANNA BELLOC AND SAMUEL BOWLES* 
 
A. Why Intergenerational Transmission of Cultural Traits is Insufficient to Explain 
Cultural Persistence 
Intergenerational transmission of cultural traits cannot explain the historical evidence for long 
term persistence of cultures (surveyed in Spolaore and Wacziang 2013) for two reasons: (A.1) 
the empirically measured degree of transmission for most traits is quite modest; (A.2) even 
where transmission is substantial, cultural differences are dissipated over just a few generations 
if there are no other mechanisms favoring persistence.  
A.1. Vertical transmission from parents, either genetic or cultural, appears to be substantial for 
some traits (those relating to political values and religion in particular), but measures of parent 
offspring similarity for most traits relevant to the study of culture seem to be quite limited.  The 
surprising weakness of vertical transmission from parents may, of course, reflect the difficulty 
in measuring preferences or other cultural traits rather than the absence of underlying effects; 
but the available data does not support the inference of strong transmission.  
A meta-study of parent-child transmission of the so-called Big Five personality traits 
yields a mean correlation of 0.13 (Loehlin 2005). Even for cognitive traits in which genetic 
transmission plays a major role, the parent offspring correlations are quite modest (for example 
0.38 for IQ (Black, et al. 2009)). Feldman, et al. (1982) found parent offspring correlations of 
0.69 for religion and 0.48 for a measure of political values, with average correlations including 
these and other cultural traits (concerning beliefs, tastes in entertainment, etc.) of 0.35. Nowak's 
sample from Poland in the early 1970s  (Nowak 1981) found no significant correlation between 
the values of parents and those of their (grown) children excepting religion. Kohn (1983: 3) 
concludes “that the relationships between parents and children's values are probably only 
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modest in magnitude.” Surveying a number of studies, he writes “studies of values have 
consistently found rather modest levels of agreement – correlations of roughly 0.15 to 0.25 – 
between parents and children.” Feldman, Cavalli-Sforza, Dornbusch, et al. (1982) find, in a 
Taiwanese sample, strong vertical transmission (parental) for religion and political beliefs but 
not for other traits (preferences for films, recreation). Rozin (1991) likewise finds evidence of 
the direct transmission of values (about homosexuality, abortion, religiosity, and other values): 
mid-parent offspring correlations averaged 0.54.  
Food tastes differ considerably between cultural groups, a major predictor of food likes 
and dislikes being one's nation or ethnic group of origin; yet parental tastes are poor predictors 
of the tastes of offspring, even when parental tastes are themselves congruent. The mean 
correlation for mid-parent-child tastes for particular foods (black coffee, lima beans, hot sauce, 
and so on) in the study by Rozin (1991) is 0.17.  He calls this the “family paradox” concerning 
“the sources of variance in preferences. Genetic factors and family influence account for a very 
small part” (Rozin 1991: 101). Because cultural differences in tastes are maintained over long 
periods of time, it seems clear that a significant part of the transmission process is taking place 
at the societal level, with important roles played by either horizontal transmission (from age 
peers) or oblique transmission (from non parents in the previous generation).   
A.2. Consider two populations. In each it is widely thought that some animal is sacred; but the 
cultures differ in which the sacred animal is: in one society it is forbidden to eat rabbits, in the 
other eating deer is taboo. Parents pass on their ideas about sacredness of animals to their 
offspring, but the process is imperfect, so that with probability r the child will adopt the norm 
of their parents, while with probability 1–r the other norm is adopted.  For plausible values of 
the transmission coefficient, r, the cultures of these two populations will become 
indistinguishable in just a few centuries, or less.  
Suppose the cultural aversion to eating rabbits or deer is very strongly transmitted directly 
from parents to offspring and that, initially, virtually all of the members of the two societies 
have adopted their respective norms; to bias the example to favor persistence suppose further 
that marital assortment is complete, so that parents always share the same trait. Let ptk  be the 
fraction of each population ( k = 1,2 ) sharing the respective norm (either rabbit taboo or deer 
taboo) at time t. This fraction in the next generation, t+1, becomes pt+1k = rptk + (1− r)(1− ptk ).  
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Assume that at time t=0 in each of the two populations p0k = 0.9 and 1− p0k = 0.1. Then 
transmission coefficients r=0.7 and r=0.85 generate a parent-offspring correlation of about a 
quarter and a half, respectively (see, e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). Figure A1 
illustrates that the two populations would be barely distinguishable after respectively 10 
generations and 5 generations. 
 
FIGURE A1: CULTURAL CONVERGENCE WITH EMPIRICALLY 
PLAUSIBLE LEVELS OF INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION 
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B. Mathematical Appendix  
B.1. First result: For sufficiently rational agents (large β), the expected waiting time for a 
transition (E[W ]) is decreasing in the superiority of the Pareto-dominant convention (Δ1i ). 
Using equation (2) in the text, we have (with i=A,B): 
lim
β→∞
Pi '(Δ1i ',β)
Pi (Δ1i ,β)
=
z!/ [(zφi* ')!(z − zφi* ')!]
z!/ [(zφi*)!(z − zφi*)!]
× lim
β→∞
[σ i (β)]zφi* '
[σ i (β)]zφi*
[1−σ i (β)]z−zφi* '
[1−σ i (β)]z−zφi*
 
where  φi* = Δ0i / (Δ0i + Δ1i ) > φi* ' = Δ0i / (Δ0i + Δ1i ')  with Δ1i ' > Δ1i , σ i (β) = 1 / (1+ eβΔ0i ),  and we have 
used the fact that zzφi*( ) = z!/ [(zφi*)!(z − zφi*)!] . Omitting the constant term and using (1) in the 
text, it follows: 
lim
β→∞
[1 / (1+ eβΔ0i )]zφi* '
[1 / (1+ eβΔ0i )]zφi*
[1−1 / (1+ eβΔ0i )]z−zφi* '
[1−1 / (1+ eβΔ0i )]z−zφi* = limβ→∞
(1+ eβΔ0i )zφi*
(1+ eβΔ0i )zφi* ' , 
where we have used the fact that limβ→∞[1−1 / (1+ eβΔ0i )] = 1.  After defining  
i
ey 0Δ≡ β   and for 
finite z , we obtain 
lim
β→∞
Pi '(Δ1i ',β)
Pi (Δ1i ,β)
= lim
y→∞
yφi*
yφi* '
$
%
&
'
(
)
z
= ∞.  
Hence, there exists β  such that for ββ >  it must be that Pi '(Δ1i ',β) > Pi (Δ1i ,β)  with Δ1i ' > Δ1i  
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and i=A,B. From equation (3) in the text it thus follows that 
E[W '] = (PA '+ PB '− PA '× PB ')−1 < E[W ] = (PA + PB − PA × PB )−1 . 
B.2. Second result: The expected waiting time for a transition (E[W ]) is increasing in the 
degree of individual rationality (β). 
Using equations (1) and (2) in the text, we obtain (with i=A,B): 
dPi[σ i (β)]
dβ =
dPi[σ i (β)]
dσ i (β)
×
dσ i (β)
dβ =
=
z!
(zφi*)!(z − zφi*)!
σ i
zφi* (1−σ i )z−zφi* [zφi*σ i−1 − (z − zφi*)(1−σ i )−1]× [−Δ0i eβΔ0i / (1+ eβΔ0i )2 ],
 
which is negative if and only if φi* −σ i > 0,  which is always the case for sufficiently large β. 
Hence from (3) in the text it follows that E[W ] = (PA + PB − PA × PB )−1  is increasing in β. 
B.3. Third result: For sufficiently rational agents, the expected waiting time for a transition 
(E[W ])  is increasing in the cost of deviation from the inferior convention (Δ0i ). 
Using equation (2) in the text, we have (with i=A,B) 
lim
β→∞
Pi '(Δ0i ',β)
Pi (Δ0i ,β)
=
z!/ [(zφi* ')!(z − zφi* ')!]
z!/ [(zφi*)!(z − zφi*)!]
× lim
β→∞
[σ i '(β)]zφi* '
[σ i (β)]zφi*
[1−σ i '(β)]z−zφi* '
[1−σ i (β)]z−zφi*
,  
where φi* ' = Δ0i '/ (Δ0i '+ Δ1i ) > φi* = Δ0i / (Δ0i + Δ1i )  and σ i (β) = 1 / (1+ eβΔ0i ) > σ i '(β) = 1 / (1+ eβΔ0i ' )   
with  ii 00 ' Δ>Δ  . Omitting the constant term, we can write: 
lim
β→∞
[1 / (1+ eβΔ0i ' )]zφi* '
[1 / (1+ eβΔ0i )]zφi*
[1−1 / (1+ eβΔ0i ' )]z−zφi* '
[1−1 / (1+ eβΔ0i )]z−zφi* = limβ→∞
(1+ eβΔ0i )zφi*
(1+ eβΔ0i ' )zφi* ' .  
After defining βey ≡  and for finite z , we obtain 
lim
β→∞
Pi '(Δ0i ',β)
Pi (Δ0i ,β)
= lim
y→∞
yΔ0i φi*
yΔ0i 'φi* '
$
%
&
'
(
)
z
= 0  
because Δ0iφi* < Δ0i 'φi* '.  Hence, there exists β  such that for ββ >  it must be that 
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Pi '(Δ0i ',β) < Pi (Δ0i ,β)  with ii 00 ' Δ>Δ  and i=A,B. From equation (3) in the text it follows that 
E[W '] = (PA '+ PB '− PA '× PB ')−1 > E[W ] = (PA + PB − PA × PB )−1 . 
B.4. Fourth result: For sufficiently rational agents, the expected waiting time for a transition 
(E[W ])  is increasing in the group size ( z ). 
Using equation (2) in the text, we have (with i=A,B): 
lim
β→∞
Pi '(z ',β)
Pi (z,β)
=
z '!/ [(z 'φi*)!(z '− z 'φi*)!]
z!/ [(zφi*)!(z − zφi*)!]
× lim
β→∞
[σ i (β)] %zφi*
[σ i (β)]zφi*
[1−σ i (β)]z '−z 'φi*
[1−σ i (β)]z−zφi*
 
with !z > z . Omitting the constant term and using equation (1) in the text, we can write: 
lim
β→∞
[1 / (1+ eβΔ0i )]z 'φi*
[1 / (1+ eβΔ0i )]zφi*
[1−1 / (1+ eβΔ0i )]z '−z 'φi*
[1−1 / (1+ eβΔ0i )]z−zφi* = limβ→∞
(1+ eβΔ0i )zφi*
(1+ eβΔ0i )z 'φi* .  
After defining y ≡ eβΔ0i φi* , we obtain 
lim
β→∞
Pi '(z ',β)
Pi (z,β)
= lim
y→∞
yz
yz ' = 0.  
Hence, there exists β  such that for ββ > , it must be that Pi '(z ',β) < Pi (z,β)  with !z > z  and 
i=A,B. From equation (3) in the text it then follows that 
E[W '] = (PA '+ PB '− PA '× PB ')−1 > E[W ] = (PA + PB − PA × PB )−1 . 
 
C. Additional Sources 
Our representation of the joint dynamics of cultures and institutions has borrowed from the 
working group on the Co-evolution of Behaviors and Institutions at the Santa Fe Institute and 
on the literature on cultural evolution initiated by:  
Boyd, Robert, and Peter J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Cavalli-Sforza, Luigi L., and Marcus W. Feldman. 1981. Cultural Transmission and 
Evolution: a Quantitative Approach. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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On why inefficient institutions persist:  
Bowles, Samuel. 2004. Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, chapters 1 and 2. 
Krusell, Per, and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull. 1996. “Vested Interests in a Theory of Stagnation 
and Growth.” Review of Economic Studies 63: 301-330. 
Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent. 1998. “The Political Economy of Absolutism Reconsidered,” in 
Analytic Narratives, eds. Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent 
Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 64-108. 
 Historical evidence on collective actions deviating from status quo cultural-institutional 
conventions (temporal and spatial correlations of protests): 
Lohmann, Susanne. 1994. “Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday 
Demonstrations in Leipzig.” World Politics 47 (1): 42-101. 
Markoff, John. 1996. The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords and Legislators in the 
French Revolution. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
McAdam, Doug. 1983. “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency.” American 
Sociological Review 48 (6): 735-54. 
 
